Global competition for critical minerals in Central Asia is accelerating. The US, China, the EU and Russia are turning the region into a strategic hub in the new great game. Critical minerals in Central Asia have become the centre of the new great power competition of the 21st century. As China, the US, the EU and Russia turn their attention to the region for strategic resources ranging from lithium to uranium, a new “Great Game” is emerging.
What is New Great Game
The rivalry between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire in Central Asia and Afghanistan is known as the “Great Game,” a term first used in 1840 by British officer Arthur Conolly (Becker, 2012). It described the strategic struggle between the two empires for influence and control in the region, often justified under a so-called civilising mission (Thorburn, 1875). The concept later gained wider recognition through Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim, which brought the geopolitical rivalry to public attention.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term re-emerged as the “New Great Game,” referring to renewed competition in Central Asia (Smith, 1996). Today, global powers such as the United States, Russia, and China are competing for influence in the region. This competition is driven by several key factors, including energy resources like oil and natural gas, strategic transit routes (Kleveman, 2003), regional security concerns linked to Afghanistan (The Caspian Post, 2026), and most importantly, the region’s rich reserves of critical raw materials essential for modern technology and defence industries.
So, what are these critical raw materials and why are they so important?
Firstly, there are two important aspects to being “critical”. The first is economic and technological: advanced technology, energy systems, and defence industries, which all states have been focusing on recently, are indispensable in these areas. The second aspect relates to supply risk. Production and processing are highly vulnerable to political or economic shocks or logistical problems (Siengchin, 2023). Factors such as “lack of substitutes”, “high geopolitical concentration” and “political instability” can be listed among the characteristics of criticality.
There are several underlying reasons for the recent strategic importance of critical raw materials. Firstly, electrification, battery storage, wind/solar, grid investments and EVs are driving demand for inputs such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, rare earths and, in particular, copper. Secondly, metals requiring high purity play a critical role in areas such as chips, communications, sensors, and defence electronics, and in this context, these materials have also led to discussions about digital sovereignty (Pathan, 2024).
To summarise, critical raw materials are vital for modern industrial development, playing a key role in renewable energy, digital technologies, aviation, defence and other sectors. These materials, composed of specific ores, are characterised by their high economic importance and vulnerability to supply disruptions. As the global transition to green energy and digitalisation accelerates, demand for these materials has risen sharply. However, the supply chains for critical raw materials are concentrated particularly in Central Asian countries, increasing geopolitical and economic risks in this region. The EU, the US, China and Russia are among the prominent actors in this regard.
Emil Dzhuraev from the Kyrgyzstan-based Crossroads Central Asia Institute also confirmed this theory in a statement to an AA correspondent: According to him, the struggle for influence in Central Asia has been going on for a long time, and with the increasing importance of critical minerals, the competition has taken on new dimensions (Anadolu Agency, 5 December 2025).
Why are Critical Minerals Strategic in Central Asia?
Note: “Critical” lists vary by country. The following set covers those most frequently mentioned in EU/US literature and with the strongest “energy–digital–defence” link.
Battery and Electrification Backbone
| Critical mineral | Role in batteries/industry | Central Asia context |
| Lithium (Li) | Core component of batteries (especially EV batteries). | Uzbekistan: The Shava-Say lithium deposit is described as “could be producible,” but it is noted that no reliable production estimate could be made for 2022 (Safirova, 2025). |
| Nickel (Ni) | Important for increasing energy density in battery chemistries. | Kazakhstan: Examples such as plans for a nickel–cobalt refining/production facility are included in the report (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Cobalt (Co) | Critical in some battery types; supply concentration is high. | Kazakhstan: Plans for production/refining targeting nickel-cobalt content are mentioned in the report (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Manganese (Mn) | Used in batteries and steel alloys; demand pressure rises with electrification. | Kazakhstan: Manganese mining/production is explicitly covered in the report (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Graphite (natural/synthetic) | Key material on the anode side. | USGS country reports: For the five countries in the region, graphite production does not stand out as a “main item.” |
The “Strategicisation” of Networks, Cabling and Industrial Metals
| Critical mineral / material | Role in electrification & industry | EU context | Central Asia context |
| Copper (Cu) | Electricity transmission; a key input for grid investments, EVs, and renewable energy infrastructure. | The EU explicitly highlights copper in the context of strategic projects (Payne, 2025, March 25). | Kazakhstan: Production data is provided in detail (Renaud, 2025a). Uzbekistan: Almalyk GMK and major porphyry copper mines (Safirova, 2025). |
| Aluminum / Bauxite | Light weight + conductivity; critical for defense/aerospace and transportation. | A topic frequently appearing in the EU’s strategic materials agenda (European Commission). | Kazakhstan: Provides tables for bauxite and primary aluminum production (Renaud, 2025a). Tajikistan: A primary aluminum producer (TALCO) (Renaud, 2025b). |
Defence, High Temperature and “Hard” Industrial Minerals
| Critical mineral / material | Key property & use | Central Asia context |
| Tungsten (W) | Very high melting point; used in hard metals, machine tools, and defense applications. | Tajikistan: Tungsten is included in the tally under the section on legislation/increasing mining areas (Renaud, 2025b). Kyrgyzstan: Noted as “may have been produced, but data is insufficient” (Renaud, 2025c). |
| Chromium / Chromite (Cr) | Critical for stainless steel and superalloys. | Kazakhstan: Provides detailed information on chromite production and related facilities (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Titanium (Ti) | Aerospace, defense, and chemicals; a critical alloy metal. | Tajikistan: Titanium appears in the list of permitted minerals (emphasis is more on potential/regulatory framework than on production) (Renaud, 2025b). |
High-Risk Metals That Have Become Classic When It Comes to Criticality
| Critical mineral / group | Main application areas | Central Asia context |
| Rare earth elements (REEs) | Magnets (especially NdPr), wind turbines/EV motors, electronics. | Kazakhstan: The report includes capacity/facility information for “REE production from uranium ore residues” (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Antimony (Sb) | Flame retardants, alloys; a “classic” critical mineral with high supply risk. | Tajikistan: Ranks high in global antimony production (emphasis on a 15% share in 2022) and it is an export item (Renaud, 2025b). Kyrgyzstan: Antimony activities are described via Kadamzhay (Renaud, 2025c). Kazakhstan: Antimony production is included in the report (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Beryllium (Be) | Aerospace, defense, high-performance alloys; supply is tight. | Kazakhstan: The report includes production/capacity tables on beryllium products and the Ulba facility (Renaud, 2025a). |
| Mercury (Hg) | Although modern uses are restricted, it remains a “critical management” issue due to some industrial uses and historical production. | Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: The report highlights global production ranking/production emphasis (Renaud, 2025b; Renaud, 2025c). |
Global Actors and Central Asian Strategies
According to Saginbekova and Amzin (December 2025), China is the world’s leading producer and consumer of critical raw materials and the country with the largest share of heavy rare earth elements. China also provides raw materials and processing capacities that other regions lack. China’s power over critical raw materials makes the EU and the US largely dependent on China. The EU, whose dependence on China exceeds 70%, is consequently vulnerable (Grohol & Veeh, 2023).
Central Asia holds significant reserves, accounting for approximately 39% of global manganese ore reserves and over 5% of copper and cobalt reserves (Sharifli, 2024). However, the region lacks sufficient processing capacity to convert these resources into high value-added products and therefore sells its raw materials to China. This further strengthens China’s hand. In other words, although Central Asian countries are rich in critical raw materials, they are dependent on China for processing and advanced technology. This dependency provides China with significant power at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions. Therefore, if actors such as the US and the EU make various investments in Central Asia, both they and the Central Asian states can break free from their dependence on China.
Critical Minerals in Central Asia and the European Union Strategy
Having correctly interpreted this, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) in 2023-2024 to promote domestic mining and processing activities, increase recycling and supporting innovation in material efficiency:
- By trading with third countries, address deficiencies in commercial data extraction and processing and diversify trading partners.
- Developing domestic reserves will increase self-sufficiency.
- Recycling and circular economy initiatives to recover critical materials and reduce dependence on primary sources.
Furthermore, according to the text, international trade is of key importance in supporting global production and ensuring diversity of supply. The EU’s actions in this regard include the following (European Commission):
- Utilising trade agreements to secure and diversify trade in critical raw materials.
- Expanding the EU’s network of strategic partnerships with a value chain approach and a strong sustainability dimension.
- Utilise the Global Gateway for software and hardware infrastructure to implement projects and support connectivity throughout the raw material value chain.
- Establish an EU export credit facility in cooperation with EU countries to reduce the risk of investments abroad.
- Combat unfair trade practices related to raw materials and increase sanctions.
Within this framework, the EU has committed to allocating significant funds to develop alternative supply corridors and international partnerships. For example, the 2024 EU-Central Asia summit has launched a €12 billion Global Gateway package, including transport and mining investments; the most important of these is a €1.6 billion project for Uzbekistan’s Almalyk copper mine (Lemaire, 2025).
US–China Competition for Critical Minerals in Central Asia
From the US perspective, this process is clearly being approached from a national security standpoint. Washington now directly defines access to critical minerals as a strategic security issue. This approach is clearly evident in the fundamental strategic documents published by the US in recent years. Indeed, the Presidential Executive Order titled “America’s Supply Chains” (Executive Order 14017, 24 February 2021) explicitly defines dependence on China in key sectors, including critical minerals, as a national security risk (Özpınar, 15 February 2026).
The US has long pursued strategic stockpiling and industrial incentives in the critical minerals sector. The Strategic Stockpile holds strategic inventories worth over $900 million, including specific metals such as zinc and cobalt (Keys, 2023). In parallel, the Pentagon has financed domestic mining and processing projects through the Defence Production Act; it is reported that approximately $1 billion has been allocated to rare earth element projects since 2019. Recent regulations such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act make domestic critical mineral production even more attractive by linking tax credits to “friendly country” content requirements (e.g., the absence of dominant Chinese state ownership in the supply chain) (Umbach, 2024).
Critical minerals are no longer merely inputs for industrial production in the United States; they are now addressed as a national security issue directly linked to military capability, technological superiority, and, on a broader scale, global power projection. Presidential Executive Order 13817 (20 December 2017), issued during Donald Trump’s term, elevated the “secure and reliable supply” of critical minerals to a strategic priority at the federal level, bringing this area to a more prominent position on the US national security agenda. This move reframed a broad group of minerals, ranging from rare earth elements to lithium, within the security discourse, taking it beyond traditional economic competition and trade debates.
This approach took on a more systematic structure under the Joe Biden administration. While Presidential Executive Order 14017 addresses supply chains through strategic vulnerabilities, the 2022 National Security Strategy positions critical minerals and advanced technology inputs as central components of the “strategic competition” with China; it explicitly acknowledges that supply chains can be used as a tool of geopolitical pressure. When read together, these three documents reveal the institutionalisation of a new era in US foreign policy, where trade and investment areas are increasingly securitised.
It is noteworthy that Kazakh President Tokayev met with European business leaders at the 77th UN General Assembly in 2022, but did not meet with President Joe Biden. Following this, in September 2023, the US hosted the “US-Central Asia” summit. A post-summit analysis revealed that the primary objective was to secure access to Central Asia’s rare earth metals. The summit’s 20 September 2023 C5+1 joint statement emphasised the aim of creating diverse, sustainable and reliable critical mineral supply chains, innovating in mining and raw material processing, and promoting regional industrial cooperation to reduce strategic dependencies (Gusseinov & Sultonnazarov, 2024). The US significantly increased its participation, notably by hosting the first C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue with senior officials from five Central Asian countries on 8 February 2024. U.S. Department of State. (2024, February 9). During the dialogue, there was a mutual desire to explore in depth the possibilities for American investment in the region’s critical minerals sectors. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu held talks on mineral investments in Kazakhstan on 26 March 2024 (US Embassy & Consulate in Kazakhstan. (2024, March 26).
This paradigm yields a clear outcome for Central Asia: even if the region is presented as an “opportunity” through investment and alternative supply narratives, in practice it is becoming a more open arena for harsher instruments of great power competition (sanctions, standards/norms, technology and financial constraints). Consequently, critical minerals are becoming less of a resource promising mere prosperity for Central Asian states and more of a strategic bargaining chip between China’s economic pull and the US’s regulatory/geopolitical pressure capacity.
As clearly stated above, China is currently the world leader in terms of production, consumption, and import/export of critical raw materials. This power is also clearly evident in Central Asia.
In 2022, following the launch of the US’s US$25 million Central Asia Economic Resilience Initiative to support regional investments in 2022, China held a summit in Central Asia on 18-19 May 2023, pledging $4 billion in financial aid to the region and highlighting the geopolitical risks of the US’s entry into the region (Синьхуа, 20 May 2023). During this period, there was also a growing awareness that the increasing engagement of the US and the EU with Central Asia may be insufficient and too late in the face of fierce competition from Russia and China in the security and economic spheres.
For China, it is extremely important to maintain its strategic superiority, particularly in the context of global power balances, and to prevent the United States and its allies from accessing new critical resource reserves. This strategy was further emphasised following French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on 1-2 November. After the visit, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Mining and Geology Bobir Islamov announced that a strategic partnership had been established between Uzbekistan and the French company Orano, and that Orano had committed to investing $500 million in uranium extraction and processing in the country (Gazeta.uz, 6 November 2023). Simultaneously, on 7 November, Uzbekistan’s Navoiuran company and the China National Nuclear Corporation signed a strategic memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the uranium sector, emphasising the importance of critical resources (Gazeta.uz, 7 November 2023).
In February 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding aimed at developing cooperation, particularly targeting minerals necessary for clean energy technologies. This agreement strategically aligns Kyrgyzstan’s National Development Programme with China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and emphasises investments in lithium, cobalt and rare earth elements (Trend News, 2025).
In terms of global raw materials, China’s relationship with Central Asia represents a significant strategic advance. By developing these partnerships, Beijing is diversifying its critical mineral supply sources while also establishing processing infrastructure that integrates seamlessly with its existing industrial base. These land-based supply routes also provide resilience against potential disruptions to maritime shipping that could affect China’s mineral imports from Africa, Australia, and Latin America (Sharifli, 2025, 25 July).
Critical Minerals in Central Asia: Russia’s Position
Russia lags behind the US, China and even the EU in terms of critical raw materials. In this context, Russia’s contribution is reflected in the literature on two levels. Firstly, through mining, the nuclear fuel cycle, corporate partnerships and technology exports; and secondly, through war, sanctions and the reorganisation of the Eurasian transport architecture (Blackwood, 2023). It is noted that Russia is attempting to revise its mining and strategic mineral policies under Western sanctions, aiming both to diversify its revenues and to create new geopolitical levers (Vidal, 2023). This reading lends itself to examining Central Asia’s critical minerals from Russia’s perspective in terms of both competition (with the West/China) and complementarity (logistics–processing–capital).
Russia’s strongest indirect impact on Central Asia’s critical raw materials equation can be seen through the “risk premium” that emerged in Eurasian transport after 2022. The fact that Russian routes have become controversial due to sanctions risk and insurance/financing constraints has led regional countries to seek alternative routes. This shift has transformed the Middle Corridor/Trans-Caspian routes into not only a commercial but also a strategic “supply security” issue (Popławski, 2024). One of the most visible examples of this context is uranium logistics. NAK Kazatomprom’s search for capacity on alternative routes bypassing Russia has been frequently cited in the literature as a case study illustrating how sanctions uncertainty affects critical mineral flows (Auyezov, 2022). The same dynamic is interpreted in regional analysis platforms as an increase in the appeal of the Middle Corridor due to the political fragility of the “main route through Russia” (Lillis, 2023).
Kazakhstan’s uranium holds geopolitical significance not only in terms of “mine-head production” but also in terms of uranium processing/enrichment and shipment. Policy reports emphasise that Kazakh uranium is vulnerable to sanctions shocks due to its Russia-linked processing and shipping routes; therefore, alternative routes (the Middle Corridor) have gained strategic value (Caspian Policy Centre, 2024). Furthermore, a development that came to public attention at the end of 2024, namely the exit of Russia-linked shares from some Kazakh uranium projects and the transfer of these shares to China-linked entities, is noteworthy in that it demonstrates how uranium can change hands as a strategic asset within the “Russia–China–Central Asia” triangle (Reuters, 2024).
Russia’s exports of nuclear technology link critical geopolitics surrounding raw materials to discussions on energy security and industrial dependency. For instance, Rosatom’s agreements with Uzatom demonstrate that, while the small modular reactor (SMR) project is ongoing, large-capacity nuclear power station (NGS) options are also being considered, establishing long-term fuel and technology partnerships (Atom Media, 2025). When considered alongside the uranium supply–fuel production–technical service–financing chain, such projects reinforce the idea that Russia is establishing an institutional ‘anchor’ in the region’s competition for critical raw materials through energy technology.
Central Asian countries are endeavouring to achieve a balance between sovereignty and sanctions risks, while concurrently maintaining relations with Russia in the post-2022 period. CRS assessments emphasise that this situation has resulted in concrete outcomes in economic channels, including currency impacts, trade diversion and transit routes (Blackwood, 2023). This context has brought the concept of “state risk management” (secondary sanctions, financing, insurance, logistics) in the competition for critical raw materials to the forefront of the literature. Indeed, the diversification of uranium shipments to bypass Russia is associated with both corporate strategy and a tendency to avoid sanctions/reputation risk at the state level (Lillis, 2023; Auyezov, 2022).
However, there are two factors that push Russia into a secondary position compared to other actors:
• The scarcity of empirical studies tracking Russia’s impact on critical metal projects in Central Asia at the micro level (company networks, capital structures, off-take agreements);
• The lack of studies modeling Russia’s role in critical minerals other than uranium (lithium, REE, copper, etc.) in a comparative manner.
These gaps make the “value chain-focused geopolitical economy” approach particularly fruitful for future research (Vakulchuk & Overland, 2021).
Conclusion
The contemporary ‘Neo Great Game’ value chain has evolved into a multi-layered competition conducted through instruments such as technology, financing, logistics corridors, and standards/sanctions. The fundamental drivers of this transformation are critical raw materials that have become strategic due to electrification, the green transition, the growth of the defence industry, and the acceleration of digitalisation.
Despite the region’s abundant mineral resources, ranging from lithium to copper and uranium to antimony, Central Asia faces significant challenges in processing these resources and converting them into high-value-added products. It is evident that countries within the region frequently function as providers of raw materials. In contrast, the processes of refining, advanced metallurgy and technology-intensive production capacities are predominantly concentrated among external entities. This situation has resulted in Central Asia becoming a ‘new competitive arena’ where economic opportunities and geopolitical pressures intersect in the age of critical raw materials.
The EU and the US are strategically positioning Central Asia as an alternative supply basin with the aim of reducing dependence on China. Meanwhile, China is deepening its sphere of influence in the region thanks to its geographical proximity, financial capacity and institutionalised network of relationships. Concurrently, Russia has been exerting an indirect yet substantial influence, particularly since 2022, through the implementation of sanctions, transit risks and transformations in the Eurasian transport architecture. This three-way competition is transforming Central Asia’s critical minerals from mere economic commodities into components of the strategic positioning of major powers.
At this juncture, the study underscores a pivotal caveat: While major players compete for their own interests, it is argued that Central Asian countries should not be relegated to a passive ‘chessboard’ position. It has been demonstrated that a nation’s abundance of natural resources is not necessarily indicative of economic prosperity and security. In the event of inadequate management, the situation can be likened to a ‘resource trap’, resulting in external dependency and a concomitant erosion of national sovereignty. It is therefore recommended that Central Asian states avoid entering into agreements that could potentially diminish the value of their long-term strategic assets in exchange for immediate financial gains. Furthermore, when considering foreign investment, it is imperative that they prioritise transparency, the generation of local added value, the transfer of technology, adherence to environmental standards, and the fulfilment of social legitimacy criteria.
The most rational course for regional countries to follow is to utilise competition to their advantage through a multi-vector and balanced foreign policy, rather than relying on a single power. The strategic significance of Central Asia, as evidenced by the keen interest of major powers, can be effectively transformed from a potential vulnerability to a bargaining advantage through the judicious design of policies. In order to achieve this objective, the following measures are recommended: (i) the implementation of industrial strategies that increase processing and refining capacity, (ii) the establishment of intra-regional coordination and joint bargaining mechanisms, (iii) the diversification of logistical processes to avoid dependence on a single route in infrastructure and corridor competition, (iv) the enhancement of institutional capacity and the implementation of anti-corruption measures in revenue management, and (v) the prioritisation of human resources and R&D investments in critical sectors.
Consequently, in the current era of heightened concern over critical raw materials, Central Asia has emerged as a pivotal region in the geopolitical landscape. However, the eventual outcome of this geopolitical dynamic is unlikely to be predominantly influenced by the actions of the major global powers. Instead, the primary determining factor will be the capacity of the Central Asian states to formulate and execute their own independent strategic agendas. Rather than being overwhelmed by the actions of dominant actors, the region possesses the potential to assert its own influence by maintaining equilibrium, adeptly managing competitive dynamics, and prioritising its own agenda.
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